Line 42 of the record
What Is Negligence Per Se in Georgia and Which Traffic Statute Violations Automatically Establish It in an Accident Case?
Negligence per se means that breaking a safety statute counts as negligence without separate proof of what a reasonable driver would have done. In Georgia traffic cases it is not automatic: the Court of Appeals has described a proven violation as “a prima facie showing of negligence”, after which the burden shifts to the driver to show the violation “was unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care”. Causation still has to be proved.
Where the rule comes from
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Georgia’s Uniform Rules of the Road in Title 40, Chapter 6, are statutes of that kind. They tell drivers when to stop, yield, stay in a lane, keep distance, and stay sober.
What a violation does, and what it leaves open
In Williams v. Calhoun (1985), a driver was deemed to have admitted that he “failed to stop at the stop sign” at a Savannah intersection and that the failure caused the collision; he had also pleaded guilty to failure to yield. The trial court called that negligence per se under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-72(b) and granted the injured driver summary judgment on liability. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained what the label means:
The plaintiff has established negligence per se in the violation of a statute, which is a prima facie showing of negligence. This means that the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the violation was unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care.
The driver had sworn that he was going a reasonable speed and that his car skidded on a wet road, an explanation the court said “could take his actions out of the realm of negligence”, so liability was for the jury. The court added that a guilty plea to a traffic charge “is only a circumstance to be considered along with other evidence by the jury”.
A 2026 decision shows the same limit from the injured side. In Pepper v. Thelen, the pickup driver who hit a disabled car on Interstate 75 had been going between 83.3 and 85 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone. The Court of Appeals still held that the injured passenger was not entitled to a directed verdict on negligence per se, “because the record does not show a conclusive and unrebutted admission of negligence per se and because there was evidence that the collision would have happened even if Thelen had been traveling within the speed limit”.
That leaves three questions for a negligence per se claim:
| Question | Who carries it |
|---|---|
| Was the statute violated? | The injured person, by evidence such as a citation, admission, video, or witnesses |
| Was the violation an excusable one, unintentional and despite ordinary care? | The driver, once a violation is shown |
| Did the violation cause this injury? | The injured person |
A driver who was a few miles per hour over the limit but was hit by someone who ran a red light has violated a statute, but the violation may have nothing to do with the crash. Causation is the step that connects the statute to the harm.
Traffic statutes that come up in crash cases
Any rule of the road can support the claim if it was violated and caused the crash. Statutes that appear in the decisions discussed on this site include:
- stop signs and yield signs (§ 40-6-72), as in Williams;
- following too closely (§ 40-6-49), the citation in Beneke v. Parker and in Thomas v. Stairs;
- lane control and leaving the roadway (§ 40-6-48);
- driving under the influence (§ 40-6-391).
None of these is “automatic” in the sense of ending the case. Each gives the injured person a strong starting point that the other driver must answer and that still requires proof of causation and damages.
Leaving the scene belongs in a different category. Section 40-6-270 places its duties to stop, give information, and render aid on the driver of a vehicle “involved in an accident”, so the duty arises only after the collision, and a driver’s flight cannot have caused that collision. Whether a failure to stop and render aid can support a claim for harm that came after the collision is a separate question from what caused the crash; in Keais v. Kelley (2026), the Court of Appeals let a wrongful death claim built on the duty to render aid go forward against a person alleged to have taken that duty over from the driver, leaving the facts to be developed. When the driver who left is never identified, the injured person’s own uninsured motorist coverage can pay, under conditions explained in which insurance applies when the at-fault driver flees.
Criminal outcomes in the civil case
A traffic ticket and a civil lawsuit are separate proceedings, and different rules govern what carries over:
- Guilty plea. In Williams, the driver’s guilty plea to a traffic charge was “only a circumstance to be considered along with other evidence by the jury”, not conclusive proof.
- Nolo contendere. A plea of nolo contendere “shall not be used against the defendant in any other court or proceedings as an admission of guilt or otherwise or for any purpose” (O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c)).
- Convictions for more serious crimes. Georgia’s hearsay exception for a “[j]udgment of previous conviction” covers a final judgment, entered after trial or on a guilty plea “but not upon a plea of nolo contendere”, for a crime “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year”, to prove facts essential to the judgment (O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(22)). Whether a particular traffic conviction falls within it turns on the punishment the offense carries.
- No conviction needed. The civil claim can prove the violation with its own evidence even if no charge was brought.
A pending criminal case can also affect the civil filing deadline; see when the Georgia personal injury filing deadline starts.
Excuses the law recognizes, and ones it does not
Because Williams puts the burden on the violator to show the violation was “unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care”, a driver may offer evidence of an excuse: a sudden brake failure despite proper maintenance, or an emergency the driver did not help create, which is governed by its own test explained in the sudden emergency doctrine in Georgia. A driver’s belief that ignoring the statute was safe is not that kind of excuse.
The injured person’s own violations count too. A plaintiff who also broke a rule of the road can be assigned a share of fault, which reduces the recovery and ends it at 50 percent; see how Georgia’s modified comparative negligence standard works.
Sources
- O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-95, 24-8-803, 51-1-6 (text as published in March 2024); O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-48, 40-6-49, 40-6-72, 40-6-270, 40-6-391.
- Williams v. Calhoun, 175 Ga. App. 332 (1985)
- Thomas v. Stairs, 215 Ga. App. 288 (1994)
- Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733 (2009)
- Pepper v. Thelen, No. A26A0817 (Ga. Ct. App. May 26, 2026); Keais v. Kelley, No. A25A2193 (Ga. Ct. App. July 15, 2026)
This page describes Georgia law as of October 2026 for general information. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.