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How Does Respondeat Superior Extend Liability From a Truck Driver to the Trucking Company in a Georgia Accident Claim?

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Georgia makes employers answer for a servant’s torts committed “in the prosecution and within the scope of his business” (O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2). For a truck crash, two questions decide it: was the driver an employee rather than an independent contractor, and was the driver on the company’s business at the time? When the company owned the truck and employed the driver, the law presumes the second answer is yes until the company offers contrary evidence.

The statute and its two questions

Section 51-2-2 reads: “Every person shall be liable for torts committed by his wife, his child, or his servant by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business, whether the same are committed by negligence or voluntarily.” The wording is old, and its family half is the root of a separate rule for household vehicles, explained in Georgia’s family purpose doctrine. For an employer, the Supreme Court of Georgia states the test this way: “whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master” (Hicks v. Heard, 2010). That is liability for the driver’s conduct; a claim that the company was itself negligent in hiring, supervising, or entrusting the driver is separate, and is discussed below.

The company-owned truck presumption

In Hicks, the Court quoted the rule from Allen Kane’s Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes (1979): “Where a vehicle is involved in a collision, and it is shown that the automobile is owned by a person, and that the operator of the vehicle is in the employment of that person, a presumption arises that the employee was in the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, and the burden is then on the defendant employer to show otherwise.”

The presumption can be answered. If uncontradicted testimony from the company or the driver shows the driver was not acting within the scope of employment, the injured person must point to “some other fact” showing the driver was within the scope of employment. Direct evidence of that fact takes the case to a jury; circumstantial evidence has to be strong enough to support a verdict.

Hicks shows how that works. Jessica Heard, a part-time clerical employee of a fuel company her father co-owned, was driving a company-owned SUV home from an exam at school when she rear-ended a car that then hit Hicks’s car. She testified she was on a personal errand. Hicks relied on Jessica’s statement that she was “on call”. The Court held that “‘on call’ status, at best, is circumstantial evidence” of scope of employment, and affirmed summary judgment for the company.

For a truck crash, the records that answer the scope question are the ones made at the time: the electronic log’s duty status, dispatch records, and the load the driver was carrying.

Employee or independent contractor

Georgia’s default rule protects a company that hires an independent contractor: “An employer generally is not responsible for torts committed by his employee when the employee exercises an independent business and in it is not subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer” (§ 51-2-4). Section 51-2-5 then lists six situations in which “An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor”, including “If the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute” and “If the employer retains the right to direct or control the time and manner of executing the work or interferes and assumes control so as to create the relation of master and servant”.

Federal leasing rules bear on the same facts without answering the state-law question. When an authorized carrier leases equipment with a driver, the lease must provide that the carrier “shall have exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment for the duration of the lease” and “shall assume complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment” for that period (49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1)). The same regulation adds: “Nothing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section is intended to affect whether the lessor or driver provided by the lessor is an independent contractor or an employee of the authorized carrier lessee” (§ 376.12(c)(4)). The federal safety rules also define “employee” to include a driver who is “an independent contractor while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle” (§ 390.5), but that definition is written for the safety regulations. With an owner-operator, the lease, the control the carrier exercised, and § 51-2-5 are the material to put in front of Georgia counsel.

Situation at the time of the crash How the scope question is approached
Company-owned truck, employed driver The presumption applies; the company must show the driver was outside the scope of employment
The same driver says the trip was a personal errand Uncontradicted testimony of that kind shifts the burden back; the injured person needs "some other fact"
The driver was "on call" At best circumstantial evidence of scope, as Hicks held
An owner-operator leased to an authorized carrier The lease must give the carrier exclusive possession, control, and use; the state-law question still turns on the control actually exercised
An independent contractor Generally no liability for the contractor's torts (§ 51-2-4), unless one of the situations in § 51-2-5 applies

What a respondeat superior admission does not end

A company that admitted it answered for its driver used to be entitled to summary judgment on separate claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention, and entrustment, unless a valid punitive damages claim against it remained. The Supreme Court of Georgia held in Quynn v. Hulsey (2020) that this rule “has been abrogated by OCGA § 51-12-33”, so those claims about the company’s own conduct can go to the jury alongside the driver’s negligence. They are explained in negligent hiring and entrustment claims against a trucking company.

Why the company matters for coverage

A for-hire interstate carrier of nonhazardous property in a vehicle rated at 10,001 pounds or more must carry at least $750,000 in public liability coverage, with higher minimums for hazardous cargo (49 C.F.R. § 387.9). That requirement attaches to the carrier, which is one reason the company’s liability matters; how the carrier is identified and what the MCS-90 endorsement adds is in a trucking company’s USDOT number and MCS-90 endorsement.

Documents that answer the two questions

Question Records
Who owned the truck? Registration, title, and any equipment lease
Was the driver an employee? Hiring and pay records, the operating agreement or lease, who set routes and schedules
Was the driver on the company's business? Electronic log duty status at the time of the crash, dispatch messages, bills of lading for the load

Several of these are kept only for limited periods; see the evidence to secure after a commercial truck crash.

Sources

This page describes Georgia law as of October 2026 for general information. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Related posts:

  1. What Is Negligent Hiring or Negligent Entrustment and How Does It Apply When a Trucking Company Employs an Unqualified Driver in Georgia?
  2. What Is the Significance of a Trucking Company’s USDOT Number and MCS-90 Endorsement in a Georgia Insurance Claim?
  3. How Does Georgia’s Direct Action Statute Allow a Claimant to Sue a Trucking Company’s Insurer Directly Rather Than Only the Insured?
  4. How Does Hit-and-Run Liability Work in Georgia and Which Insurance Coverage Applies When the At-Fault Driver Flees?
  5. Can a Georgia Accident Victim Sue the At-Fault Driver Personally in Addition to Pursuing an Insurance Claim?
  6. Truck Accident Law Firms in Macon, Georgia
  7. What Evidence Must Be Secured Immediately After a Commercial Truck Crash in Georgia Including Electronic Logging Device Data and Dashcam Footage?
  8. What Federal Regulations Govern Commercial Truck Drivers Operating in Georgia?